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Abstract
This paper describes a dynamic, general equilibrium model designed to assess whether
contractual imperfections in the form of limited enforcement can account for international
diﬀerences in the organization of production. In the model, limited enforcement con-
strains agents to operate establishments below their optimal scale. As a result, economies
where contracts are enforced more eﬃciently tend to be richer and emphasize large scale
production. Calibrated simulations of the model reveal that these eﬀects can be large and
account for a sizeable part of the observed diﬀerences in the size distribution of manufac-
turing establishments between the United States, Mexico and Argentina.
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11 Introduction
Property rights are not eﬀectively enforced in developing nations. For instance, Djankov et al.
(2002) calculate that it takes about 300 days on average to collect on a bad check in Argentina
or Mexico, compared to 50 days in the U.S. In this paper, I assess the importance of the
imperfect enforcement of ﬁnancing contracts for documented diﬀerences in the organization of
production between developing economies and the U.S.
I consider a dynamic version of the industrial organization model proposed by Lucas
(1978). Agents diﬀer in terms of managerial talent and the bequest they receive. Each period,
they can either work as unskilled workers or manage a strictly concave technology that trans-
forms unskilled labor and physical capital into the unique consumption good. Managers need
to ﬁnance both their physical capital and payroll. They can write long-term ﬁnancing con-
tracts with an intermediary, but the contractual framework is imperfect. Speciﬁcally, agents
can decide to default on the payment stipulated by the contract in return for the advance of
funds they receive. The intermediary can seek to enforce this payment and are successful with
a ﬁxed, exogenous probability. This probability is my proxy for the eﬃciency of enforcement
institutions in the economy under consideration.
Because enforcement is limited, some managers are borrowing constrained and operate
establishments at a sub-optimal scale. I measure the impact of the resulting distortions by way
of calibrated numerical simulations. Quite intuitively, rises in the probability of enforcement
result in higher steady state output and labor productivity. Furthermore, production establish-
ments are larger on average and a larger share of employment is found in small establishments
2in more productive economies, which is consistent with the well-documented fact that devel-
oping nations emphasize small scale production (see e.g. Tybout, 2001). In fact, I argue that
the model can generate a distribution of establishments and employment across size categories
that closely resembles its empirical counterparts in Mexico or Argentina. In addition, I ﬁnd
that wealth and income are more equally distributed in economies where contracts are better
enforced. These ﬁndings indicate that a model of development that incorporates contractual
imperfections can account for several distinguishing features of developing economies.
This work builds on a number of studies of environments with limited commitment. Kehoe
and Levine (1993) study the impact of limited commitment on asset trading while Kocherlakota
(1996) considers eﬃcient consumption allocations. Marcet and Marimon (1992) measure the
eﬀect of limited commitment in a stochastic growth model. Monge (1999) studies the impact
of interest rate volatility on ﬁrm dynamics in an environment very similar to the one developed
in this paper. Cooley et al. (2000) study the implications of limited enforceability for the
business cycle and the investment policy and dynamics of ﬁrms. This paper extends this work
by gauging the quantitative impact of contractual frictions on the organization of production,
and builds upon the work of Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Quadrini (2000) on the impact of
ﬁnancing constraints on entrepreneurship and wealth accumulation. My work also relates to the
literature on the link between ﬁnancial intermediation and economic development. McKinnon
(1973) and Shaw (1973) provide some empirical evidence of this link for several nations. King
and Levine (1993) report a correlation between ﬁnancial and economic development with cross-
country data. More generally, the model is consistent with the correlation between the quality
3of a nation’s institutions and its level of development, as documented for instance by Hall and
Jones (1998) or Barro (1991).
2 The organization of production in developing economies
Tables 1 shows the distribution of manufacturing establishments and employment in the U.S.,
Mexico and Argentina in 1988.1 Nearly 84 percent of establishments count 10 or fewer employees
in Mexico while fewer than half of establishments have between 1 and 9 employees in the U.S.
Establishments with 50 or more employees account for over 80 percent of all employment in the
U.S., compared to 75 percent in Mexico, and less than half of all employment in Argentina.
Tybout (2000) presents similar data for a larger cross-section of countries. In many
developing countries, including large countries such as India or Indonesia, the majority of
manufacturing employment is found in establishments with fewer than ten employees. Tybout
also presents a survey of existing explanations for this phenomenon. For instance, developing
nations tend to emphasize items that can be produced eﬃciently on a small scale.2 However,
table 2 presents some disaggregated data for the U.S. and Mexico that indicate that diﬀerences
1The data for Argentina come from the country’s household survey and allow one to estimate the distrib-
ution of employment, but not the size distribution of establishments. Also note that throughout this paper, I
concentrate on data from the manufacturing sector because in nations with large informal sectors like Mexico
or Argentina, economic censuses of non-manufacturing establishments are unreliable. Manufacturing censuses
are not immune to this weakness, but because manufacturing establishments tend to be less mobile than other
establishments, they are counted with more precision.
2To the extent that ﬁnancing constraints contribute to this feature of the composition of output, the model
I present in this paper could be viewed as a related explanation.
4Table 1: Size distribution of manufacturing establishments and employment
U.S., 1988
Employment size 0 to 9 10 to 49 50 to 249 250+
Percent of establishments 48.1 33.0 15.0 3.9
Percent of employment 3.3 14.0 30.1 52.6
Mexico, 1988
Employment size 0 to 10 11 to 50 51 to 250 251+
Percent of establishments 83.6 10.7 4.3 1.4
Percent of employment 11.9 13.0 24.7 50.4
Argentina, 1988
E m p l o y m e n ts i z e 0t o1 5 1 6t o5 0 5 1 +
Percent of employment 37.9 20.7 41.4
Source: County business pattern survey, Census Bureau (U.S.), Economic census, INEGI (Mex-
ico), Permanent household survey, INDEC (Argentina).
in the composition of manufacturing output are unlikely to fully explain observed diﬀerences
in the size distribution of establishments.3
Rauch (1991) proposes another explanation for the importance of small scale production in
developing nations. In those countries, many ﬁrms do not comply with government regulations
and choose to operate a small scale to avoid detection. The model I describe in this paper
suggests another channel via which the importance of informal economic activities matters
for the organization of production. It is diﬃcult for informal, unregistered ﬁrms to write
legally enforceable contracts. Not surprisingly then, informal ﬁrms have little access to outside
3Further disaggregation continues to show that in most sectors establishments are much larger on average
in the U.S. than in Mexico.
5Table 2: Average employment size of establishments in manufacturing sub-sectors, 1988
U.S. Mexico
Food and kindred products 70.79 10.78
Tobacco products 323.74 243.84
Textile mill products 107.93 25.47
Apparel and other textile products 48.37 14.56
Lumber and wood products 21.68 8.49
Paper and allied products 98.80 18.22
Printing and publishing 25.23 12.47
Chemicals and allied products 69.15 71.73
Petroleum and coal products 53.34 44.98
Stone, clay and glass products 32.69 10.52
Primary metal industries 108.00 115.30
Fabricated metal products 41.73 28.75
Industrial machinery and equipment 37.66 28.52
Transportation equipment 177.87 160.69
Instruments and related products 98.33 38.49
Sources: INEGI and Census Bureau
ﬁnancing, as documented for instance by Thomas (1992) and Mansell Carstens (1995). These
ﬁrms are therefore constrained to operate a suboptimal scale.
3 The model
3.1 Physical environment
Each period a cohort of measure one of agents are born. They live T periods, where T>2. In
the ﬁrst T − 1 periods of their life, agents are endowed with a unit of productive time which
they devote to managing productive resources or, instead, to delivering labor. They are also
endowed with an innate level z ∈ (0,1] of managerial ability. An agent’s managerial ability
6is public information and remains unchanged as he ages. In addition, the distribution µ of
managerial ability has ﬁnal support and is constant across cohorts.
An agent of managerial ability z ∈ (0,1] who, in a given period, manages amounts k ≥ 0
of physical capital and n ≥ 0 of unskilled labor produces quantity
F(k,n;z)=Azk
αkn
αn +( 1− δ)k
of the unique consumption good, where A,αk,α n > 0a n dαk+αn < 1. Throughout this paper,
I will think of a production unit consisting of a manager together with some physical capital
and unskilled labor as an establishment.
At the beginning of each period, agents choose an occupation. Agents who choose to
become managers employ ﬁxed quantities of unskilled labor and physical capital for the duration
of the period. Output is delivered at the end of the period but labor must be paid before
production can start.
All agents have linear preferences and discount consumption ﬂows at a rate of β.W h a t ’ s
more, a ﬁxed proportion φ<1 of each cohort leaves a non-negative bequest g>0t oas i n g l e












where ct is the agent’s consumption at age t. Newly born agents receive their bequest at the
beginning of the ﬁrst period of their life. Both the altruistic and managerial type of each agent
7are independent of their parent’s. I impose the following assumption on the degree γ of altruism
to place a bound on each lineage’s wealth:
Assumption 1. γβ−T < 1
The economy also comprises a ﬁnancial intermediary with access to perfect, outside capital
markets where a risk-free security earns return r ≡ β−1 − 1. One should therefore think of
this economy as a small, open economy. Given thea s s u m e dr i s kf r e er a t ea n dt h el i n e a r i t yo f
preferences, agents seek to maximize the discounted value of their lifetime income, and altruistic
agents bequeath fraction γβ−(T−1) of that value to their oﬀspring.
3.2 Contracts
Given the timing of production, managers need to ﬁnance both the quantity of physical capital
they choose to employ and their payroll before production can start. For this purpose, the in-
termediary and newly born agents write ﬁnancing contracts. A ﬁnancing contract is a sequence
{dt,ρ t}T
t=1 that stipulates for every period t of the agent’s life a quantity dt ≥ 0 of consumption
good advanced to the agent at the start of the period, and a net transfer ρt from the agent to
the intermediary at the end of the period. (The total stipulated transfer from the agent to the
intermediary at the end of period t is dt(1 + r)+ρt.)4
The intermediary can commit fully to the terms of the contract, but agents have the
option to renege on the stipulated transfer at the end of any period. When an agent exercises
4One can interpret the ﬁnancing contract as a debt contract between a bank and a manager. Alternatively,
the intermediary can be interpreted as a corporation that hires the agent to provide unskilled labor or manage
resources. In this interpretation, the corporation is the proprietor of all output produced and the manager’s net
income sequence is a compensation scheme.
8this option, they are caught with probability θ ∈ [0,1] in which case the transfer is enforced.
This probability is my proxy for the eﬃciency with which contracts are enforced in a given
economy and constitutes the basis of the comparative statics exercise I carry out in this paper.
3.2.1 Self-ﬁnancing
It will prove useful to ﬁrst consider the problem agents solve when they must self-ﬁnance all
production. Let w>0 be the wage, i.e. the price of labor. (Throughout, I concentrate my
attention on equilibria in which the wage is constant.) An agent of talent z and age t who in a
given period operates with quantity a ≥ 0 of the consumption good5 solves:
maxn,k≥0 F(k,n;z) − k(1 + r) − nw(1 + r)
subject to: nw + k ≤ a
Let π(a;z,w) be the corresponding net income while k(a;z,w)a n dn(a;z,w) are the associated
policies. When δ<1 the cost of physical capital relative to labor decreases when the ﬁnancing
constraint is relaxed. This leads to:6
Lemma 2. For any (z,w) ∈ (0,1] × I R++,
k(.;z,w)
n(.;z,w) is increasing.
Lemma 2 says that all else equal, managers who are more ﬁnancing constrained choose to
operate their establishment at a lower physical capital to unskilled labor ratio, an observation
5For notational simplicity, assume that managers can costlessly transform the consumption good into the
capital good.
6The proof of this result, as all proofs in this paper, is in the appendix.
9which will help me interpret some of the numerical results of section 4. Now deﬁne:
V
S







i max{w(1 + r),π(at+i;z,w)}
subject to:
at = a
at+i ≤ at+i−1(1 + r)+m a x {w(1 + r),π(at+i−1;z,w)}∀ i ≥ 1
With this notation, V S
1 (b;z,w) is the agent’s maximum discounted lifetime income when all
production must be self-ﬁnanced and his initial bequest is b ≥ 0. How much they can improve
upon this lower bound depends on what ﬁnancing contracts can be written.
3.2.2 Competitive contracts









This function gives the expected remaining lifetime utility of a manager of age t and ability z
who defaults on a payment ρ due for an advance d of the consumption good, assuming they
are unable to borrow after defaulting. With probability θ, they are caught, in which case they
make the stipulated payment and start the next period with a quantity π(d;z,w) − ρ of the
consumption good. With probability (1 − θ), they are not caught, and start period t +1w i t h
10aq u a n t i t yπ(d;z,w)+dβ−1, the sum of their net income in period t and the accrued value of
the advance of consumption good.
Consider now an agent of managerial ability z ∈ [0,1] born with a bequest b ≥ 0. I will
call a ﬁnancing contract {dt,ρ t}T
t=1 feasible when:
bβ
−1 +m a x {wβ
−1,π(d1;z,w)}−ρ1 ≥ 0( 1 )
max{wβ




t−1ρt ≥ 0( 3 )







t (dt,ρ t;z,w,θ)( 4 )
The ﬁrst two conditions state that the agent’s net payment to the intermediary cannot exceed
his net income in any period of his life. The third equation says that the contract must be
actuarially fair for the intermediary: the expected present value of the payments he receives
must exceed the present value of the quantities of the consumption good advanced. The last
set of conditions is the requirement that in any period of the contract, the agent must be better
oﬀ following the terms of the contract than defaulting. The left-hand side of these expressions
is the opportunity cost of defaulting, namely the present value of the remaining income ﬂows
stipulated by the contract. The right-hand side is the expected present value of income after
default, provided agents are excluded from future borrowing.
11This notion of feasibility can be justiﬁed by standard contract-theoretic arguments (see
Kocherlakota, 1996).7 In particular, punishing default with complete exclusion from borrowing
weakens incentive compatibility problems as much as possible, and is therefore optimal.
I assume that the intermediary behaves competitively: among the set of feasible contracts,








subject to (1-4). I will refer to solutions to this problem as competitive contracts.S i n c e n e t
income is bounded above given the agent’s characteristics, a competitive contract exists for
all agent types. In fact, competitive contracts can be computed by dynamic programming
techniques as in Spear and Srivastava (1987) or Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (1997).
3.2.3 Properties of competitive contracts
Let d∗(w,z) = argmaxd π(d;w,z) be the optimal advance for an agent of ability z when there
are no contractual imperfections (θ = 1). Absent contractual imperfections, agents become
managers when π(d∗(w,z);w,z) ≥ w and always operate their technology at its unique optimal
scale. This subsection describes the impact of limited enforcement on occupational choices and
the allocation of resources. The following result will prove useful:8
7A complete argument is available upon request.
8This is a version of corollary 1 in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 1997.
12Lemma 3. There exists a competitive contract {dt,ρ t}T
t=1 such that
ρ1 = bβ
−1 +m a x {wβ
−1,π(d1;z,w)} and,
ρt =m a x {wβ
−1,π(dt;z,w)}∀ 1 <t<T
This intuition for this result is simple: postponing consumption weakens incentive com-
patibility constraints. Note that the consumption strategy implied by this result may exhibit
superﬂuous patience. It is enough to postpone consumption up to the point where the no-
default constraint no longer binds, which may occur strictly before the last period. But for
simplicity and without any loss of generality, I restrict my attention to contracts that satisfy
the two properties of lemma 3. Under this convention, the value of default in a given period









Observe that the value of default for a given advance d decreases with t,s i n c eV S
t+1(π(d;z,w)+
dβ−1;z,w) does. As a result, agents are more likely to become managers as they become older.
The following result records this observation, and points out that agents born with higher
bequests are also more likely to become managers.
Proposition 4. Assume that {dt,ρ t} is a competitive contract for agents of type (b,z).T h e n ,
1. dt+1 > 0= ⇒ dt+1 ≥ dt for all t ∈{ 1,T− 2},
2. {dt,ρ t} is feasible for agents of type (b ,z) for all b  ≥ b.
13In the ﬁrst part of the proposition, the premise dt+1 > 0 is necessary because it is possible
for an agent of type z to be indiﬀerent between the two occupations for two consecutive period.
It should be obvious that this may only happen when π(d∗(w,z);w,z)=w.I n t h a t c a s e ,
an agent could choose to become a manager in a period, but a worker in the next, which
would yield a decreasing advance sequence. But in the generic case, proposition 4 implies that
the optimal occupational proﬁle is characterized by an age threshold. Once agents become
managers, they remain managers for the rest of their life. It also implies that managers run
larger establishments as they grow older. Therefore, establishment growth takes the form of
convergence towards their optimal scale. The second result says that, ceteris paribus, agents
born with larger bequests will be advanced more funds in every period, become managers
earlier and run larger plants at every age. Put another way, proposition 4 says that limited
enforcement disrupts the allocation of resources in two ways. First, talented agents may have to
become unskilled workers because they are unable to borrow enough funds while less talented
but older or wealthier agents become managers. In addition, managers are generally constrained
to operate an establishment at a sub-optimal scale.
I will now characterize the impact of changes in θ on the set of competitive contracts. Let
V ∗(b,z;w,θ) denote the maximum discounted lifetime income for an agent of type (b,z)g i v e n
w and θ,w h i l e ,a sb e f o r e ,V S
1 (b;z,w) is the lifetime income an agent can obtain without outside
ﬁnancing. Clearly, V ∗(b,z;w,θ) ≥ V S
1 (b;z,w), and V ∗(b,z;w,θ) − V S
1 (b;z,w) can be thought
of as measuring the extent to which agents rely on outside ﬁnancing. When θ = 0, agents who
decide to default are excluded from future borrowing but face no other cost. The next result
says that under those circumstances no outside lending can be supported, as in Bulow and
14Rugoﬀ (1989). It also makes note of the fact that as θ rises, the availability of outside ﬁnancing
rises monotonically.
Proposition 5. For all (b,z;w) ∈ I R+ × [0,1] × I R++,
1. V ∗(b,z;w,0) = V S
1 (b;z,w),
2. V ∗(b,z;w,θ) rises with θ.
I now turn to characterizing steady state equilibria.
3.3 Steady state equilibria
3.3.1 Deﬁnition
A steady state equilibrium is a value w>0 for the unskilled wage, a distribution ν of initial
bequests, and ﬁnancing contracts for each agent such that almost all ﬁnancing contracts are
competitive, the labor market clears, and the distribution of bequest is invariant. To make this
more precise, for t ≥ 0d e n o t eb yηt(d;b,z) the mass of agents of age t,i n i t i a lb e q u e s tb and
managerial ability z whose contract stipulates an advance d ≥ of the consumption good. In









d(ηt × ν × µ)=0 ( 5 )
15The ﬁrst term in equation (5) is the aggregate demand for labor, while the second term gives
the aggregate supply of unskilled labor.9 In addition, the distribution of bequests must be
constant, i.e., for any Borel subset B ⊂ I R+, the following condition holds:10
(1 − φ)1B{0} + φ

{γβT−1V ∗(b,z;w,θ)∈B}
d(ν × µ)=ν{B} (6)
3.3.2 Comparative statics
The remainder of this paper is devoted to comparing steady state equilibria in economies that
diﬀer only in the degree θ to which ﬁnancing contracts can be enforced. For a given θ,t h e
mapping from unskilled wages to the excess demand for unskilled labor can be decomposed into
two separate mappings. The ﬁrst maps the wage w to the unique distribution νw of bequests
that satisﬁes (6). The second operator maps this distribution into the set of corresponding
values for the aggregate excess demand for unskilled labor. In appendix A.2, I show that νw is
the unique ﬁxed point of strongly convergent Markov process. After guessing w and solving for
competitive contracts, both integrals in (5) can then be computed by applying the law of large
numbers.11
It seems natural to conjecture that an increase in the eﬃciency with which contracts
are enforced has a positive impact on labor productivity. Indeed, let w be the steady state
9The labor demand function n given a agent’s type and the ﬁnancing with which they operate is deﬁned in
section 3.2.1.
10Here, 1B denotes the indicator function corresponding to set B.
11The basic algorithm I use in my quantitative exercises consists of updating w until this excess demand is
approximately zero. I increase w when there is an excess demand for labor, decrease it otherwise. In all cases,
I also carry out a global grid search over the relevant range of prices to verify that the steady state equilibria I
report are unique.
16unskilled wage when the probability of enforcement is θ ∈ [0,1]. Assume now that θ rises
to θ . The set of competitive contracts corresponding to θ and w remains feasible when θ
rises. Therefore, the unique stationary invariant bequest distribution under (w,θ )ﬁ r s to r d e r
stochastically dominates the equilibrium distribution of bequests under (w,θ). By proposition 4,
it now follows that there must be an excess demand for labor at w and one would expect the
unskilled wage to increase. In the special case where φ = 0, one can show analytically that
economies where contracts are better enforced are indeed more productive:
Proposition 6. Assume φ =0 .
1. A steady state exists for all θ ∈ [0,1]
2. Assume that w is a steady state wage given θ ∈ [0,1]. Then for any θ  >θa steady wage
w  exists with w  ≥ w.
The opportunity cost of becoming a manager thus tends to rise when θ rises and, conse-
quently, one would expect the equilibrium proportion of managers to decrease and the average
size of establishments to rise. However, changes in θ and the unskilled wage have non-trivial
eﬀects on the quantity of funds managers are able to borrow, both directly and via their im-
pact on the equilibrium distribution of bequests. Furthermore, the optimal employment-size
of establishments decreases with the unskilled wage. The next section describes the result of
these potentially conﬂicting forces via numerical methods.
174 Quantitative results
4.1 Parameters
I begin this section by selecting exogenous parameters so that the economy described in this
paper generates steady state statistics that match the relevant U.S. statistics. I set T =6s ot h a t
assuming a productive life of 40 years, each period corresponds to 8 years.12 I assume β =0 .79
which implies a yearly real interest rate of roughly 3 percent. As for altruism parameters,
Leitner and Ohlson (2001) ﬁnd that 35 percent of respondents both of whose parents are dead
report receipt of a positive inheritance in the 1984 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
I therefore set φ =0 .35. In that year, the PSID included data on cumulative inheritances. In
present value terms (with a yearly discount rate of 3 percent), the average per capita amount
inherited conditional on receiving a positive inheritance, represents approximately 5 percent of
individuals’ mean lifetime earnings in the PSID sample. When γ =0 .04, my economy matches
this observation.
Turning now to technological parameters, assume ﬁrst that there are no contractual im-
perfections (θ =1 ) .T h e nαk is the share of capital income in GDP, approximately a third in
the U.S. Similarly, when θ = 1, the managerial share of GDP is 1 − αn − αk. This managerial
share could be set to match the ratio of proprietor’s income to national income, approximately
9% for the 1960-85 period in the U.S. But this ratio is a poor measure of what the managerial
share represents in my model since corporations constitute the leading form of ownership in
12Recall that agents do not work in the last period of their life. The computational complexity of my exercise
rises quickly as T rises. While raising T up to 6 periods yields noticeably diﬀerent outcomes, raising T further
appears to aﬀect my results only marginally.
18the U.S., and corporate data does not enable one to measure the share of value added that
accrues to ﬁxed managerial inputs. I choose instead to use sole proprietorship data for all years
for which data is available from the IRS in the 1979-1992 period. To measure 1 − αn − αk,I
assume that αk is the share of net income that remunerates the sole proprietor’s own capital,
while 1 − αk is the share remunerating their managerial input. I ﬁnd that for manufacturing
sole proprietorships in the U.S., the ratio
(1−αk)Net income
Value added averages to 14.8 percent, where value
added is business receipts minus cost of sales and operation, excluding cost of labor. I thus set
αk =0 .33 and 1 − αk − αn =0 .85.13
Naturally, θ = 1 is not an adequate assumption for the U.S., and below I will argue for a
value θ strictly smaller than 1. After making that change however, I ﬁnd that the capital and
managerial shares of income in steady state do not change much, and, correspondingly, leave
technological parameters unchanged.14 As for δ, the depreciation, rate, I set it to 0.44 (that is,
7 percent yearly) which yields a capital to (yearly) GDP ratio of roughly 3.20, near standard
estimates of this ratio in the U.S.
There remains to specify the distribution of managerial talent, and the degree θ to which
contracts can be enforced. Given other exogenous parameters, I choose those two parameters
to jointly match the U.S. distribution of manufacturing establishments across size categories,
and the average rate of growth of manufacturing establishments. The speciﬁc procedure is
described in appendix A.3 and the calibrated distribution of talent is shown in ﬁgure 1. Setting
13Interestingly, Atkeson and Ohanian (1996), using very diﬀerent calibration arguments, arrive at the same
degree of strict concavity of the production function. In my calibration approach, an implicit assumption is
that diﬀerent ownership types are not associated with systematically diﬀerent technological opportunities.
14Furthermore, the results I present in this paper are not sensitive to even large changes in technological
parameters.
19θ =0 .72, together with the distribution of managerial talent shown in ﬁgure 1, approximately
yields the desired average growth and size distribution of establishments. In the U.S., large
manufacturing establishments represent a small fraction of the total number of establishments,
but account for most employment. For my economy to be consistent with this feature, µ must
assign positive mass to an outlying set of highly talented managers, as shown in ﬁgure 1.
I will now ask whether θ can be found so that instead of an economy where the size distri-
bution of establishments resembles the U.S., the model economy generates a distribution similar
to the distribution one observes in Argentina, Mexico or other developing nations. Obviously,
developing economies diﬀer from the U.S. economy in more than one respect. The goal of the
exercise, however, is to focus on the quantitative importance of contractual imperfections.
4.2 Impact of limited enforcement
Figure 2 plots various steady state statistics as a function of the degree θ to which contracts
can be enforced. Economies with better enforcement technologies are richer (aggregate output
rises with θ, panel A) and more productive (w, the marginal product of labor also rises with θ,
panel B.)
As discussed before proposition 5, limited enforcement disrupts the allocation of produc-
tive resources by limiting the quantity of funds available to managers. To see this quantitatively,
deﬁne the proportion of self-ﬁnancing for a given contract by s1 = b





20This gives the proportion of the funds employed by managers that could be ﬁnanced with past
income. Let ¯ s be the economy wide average of this ratio, in steady state and deﬁne the average
proportion of outside ﬁnancing by 1 − ¯ s. This measure of average outside ﬁnancing is plotted
in panel C. Managers operate with more outside ﬁnancing and, therefore, operate close to their
optimal scale of operation as θ rises. In fact, the average size of establishments rises with θ
(panel D) while, at the same time, the optimal scale of operation of a given establishment falls
since the wage rises. Richer economies, in this model like in the data, emphasize large scale
production. They also operate at a higher capital to output ratio (panel E.) This is largely
because the wage rate rises with θ, but is also due to the force described in lemma 2. Even at
a constant wage, managers who are less ﬁnancing constraint employ more capital because the
relative price of capital falls with the shadow price of ﬁnancing.
Note that the average growth rate of plants between their ﬁrst and second period of
existence (panel F) is relatively stable until roughly θ =0 .7 but falls sharply past that point.
In fact, past θ =0 .9 all establishments are operated at their optimal scale in all periods,
and therefore do not grow. The sharp fall in growth rates around θ =0 .7 coincides with the
tapering oﬀ of the average size of establishments. To understand why average size stops rising,
note that when θ goes up the fraction of agent who choose to become managers (which is
inversely related to the average size of establishments) is aﬀected by two forces. The wage goes
up, which all else equal means that fewer agent can proﬁtably operate an establishment, but all
agents have a better access to outside ﬁnancing. For low values of θ large rises in the wage are
the dominating eﬀect. When θ approaches one, the wage eﬀect becomes small and the average
size of establishments begins to fall, albeit slightly.
21The bottom two panels of chart 2 describe the impact of limited enforcement on the distri-
bution of bequests and lifetime income. The degree of bequest inequality tends to decrease with
θ as does inequality in lifetime earnings. Intuitively, when the wage is low, the income diﬀerence
between workers and managers is large. But the relationship between limited enforcement and
inequality is not monotonic: inequality initially rises with θ.W h e n θ = 0, all production is
self-ﬁnanced, and even managers of high talent are unable to generate much income, despite
the fact that wages are low. But the availability of outside ﬁnancing rising steeply with θ,a n d
the gini coeﬃcient begins to fall very early.
4.3 Size distribution of manufacturing establishments
The model is broadly consistent with the fact that poor economies emphasize low scale produc-
tion, but I now subject the model to a more demanding quantitative test. When θ is selected
so that the average scale of operation resembles what one observes in Argentina and Mexico,
does the distribution of employment also resemble what one observes in those countries? The
answer turns out to be positive.
When θ =0 .2 the average size of establishments matches the average size of manufacturing
establishments in Mexico in 1988 (approximately 19 employees per establishment.) Table 3
compares the simulated distribution of establishments and employment across size categories
when θ =0 .2 to its empirical counterpart shown in table 1. The model, given its parsimony,
generates distributions that are remarkably close to Mexican data. When θ =0 .1, the average
size of establishments is now about 10 employees per establishment, which is near its empirical
22Table 3: Size distribution of establishments
θ =0 .72
Employment size [0,10] (10,50] (50,250] >250
Percent of establishments 47.4 33.3 15.5 3.8
Percent of employment 3.6 14.6 31.0 50.8
θ =0 .20
Employment size [0,10] (10,50] (50,250] >250
Percent of establishments 85.6 9.6 3.6 1.2
Percent of employment 18.1 14.1 24.4 43.4
θ =0 .10
Employment size [0,15] (15,50] >50
Percent of establishments 93.7 4.1 2.2
Percent of employment 32.3 12.3 55.4
counterpart for Argentina in the mid-80’s.15 The simulated distribution now resembles the data
from Argentina’s 1988 household survey shown in table 1 in that about a third of employment
is found in establishments with 15 employees or fewer.
4.4 Does wealth redistribution alleviate contractual imperfections?
The previous experiments suggest that improving the enforcement of property rights in nations
where they are poorly enforced has the potential to markedly raise income per capita. But
improving legal institutions is costly in nations where the bureaucracy is ineﬃcient, and ﬁscal
resources are limited. A question of practical interest therefore, is whether wealth redistribution
policies can serve as a partial substitute for investments in property rights enforcement.
15That average was 10.7 employees in 1985, 8.5 employees in 1993. Argentina carries out an economic census
once a decade.





Average size of plants 19.26 18.91
Plants with fewer than 10 emp. (%) 87.83 87.32
Intuitively, since bequest size is assumed independent of managerial talent, bequest in-
equality potentially ampliﬁes the disruption in the allocation of resources that occurs when
enforcement is limited. Wealthy agents become managers while managers with less inherited
funds, but more talent, are constrained to become unskilled workers. Consider therefore the
following bequest redistribution experiment when θ =0 .2. Assume that bequests are pooled
and redistributed evenly. Assume further (for simplicity and the to give this experiment the
greatest chance to have a large aggregate eﬀect) that this does not aﬀect the bequest policy
of altruistic agents. The results are summarized in the second column of table 4. While the
impact on output is slightly positive, it is very small. That is, even drastic wealth redistribution
policies do very little to alleviate the impact of limited enforcement.16
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper describes and measures the impact of the imperfect enforceability of ﬁnancing
contracts in a dynamic, general equilibrium model. Limited enforcement distorts the allocation
16Even a policy such that only agents who choose to become managers receive a bequest raises output and
labor productivity very little. Those results are available upon request.
24of productive resources across establishments by imposing borrowing constraints on managers.
As a result, labor productivity, output, and the average size of establishments all rise when the
enforcement of contracts improves, while wealth and income inequality fall.
Calibrated numerical simulations indicate that limited enforcement can account for much
of the documented diﬀerences in the size distribution of establishments between Latin America
and the U.S. Many developing nations lack a well-functioning, eﬀective judicial system and
property rights are not adequately enforced. The results presented here indicate that these
imperfections have an large impact, particularly on the organization of production. In addition,
I ﬁnd that wealth redistribution schemes are not a good substitute for improving the degree to
which contracts are enforced.
In more general terms, my results suggest that contractual imperfections are important for
economic development. All the economies I consider operate with the same amounts of human
and physical resources. But in economies where contracts are poorly enforced, the misallocation
of this resources reduces aggregate income by as much as 50 percent. The magnitude of these




A.1.1 Proof of lemma 2




λ + δ + r
w(λ +1+r)
where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the ﬁnancing constraint. One easily
shows that λ decreases with a, i.e. that π is concave in a.S i n c eδ<1, the equality above now
implies that k
n decreases with a as claimed.
A.1.2 Proof of lemma 3
Proof. Consider a competitive contract such that, say, feasibility condition (1) does not bind.
Increase ρ1 until the condition binds and decrease ρT until feasibility condition (3) binds. The
advance proﬁle stipulated by the competitive contract remains feasible since the left-hand side
of every equation in feasibility condition (4) rises. Furthermore, since the rates of interest and
time preference coincide, this leaves the agent’s lifetime income unchanged so that the altered
contract is a competitive contract as well.
A.1.3 Proof of proposition 4
Proof. To see the ﬁrst item, consider without loss of generality the payment proﬁle described
in lemma 3. Since all consumption is postponed until the last period, the opportunity cost
of default grows at the rate of interest β−1 − 1. On the other hand, the value of defaulting
with a given advance of funds decreases as the agent ages. Therefore, the maximum advance
compatible with the no-default constraint is non-decreasing. As for the second item, note that
any contract feasible for a given pair (b,θ) remains feasible when b or θ rises.
A.1.4 Proof of proposition 5
Proof. Let θ = 0 and consider, without loss of generality, contracts that satisfy the condi-
tions of lemma 3. Note that feasibility condition (3) must bind at any competitive con-
tract so that V ∗(b,z;w,0) =
T−1















so that feasibility condition (4) is violated in period T −1. One can then proceed by induction
to show that no net lending can take place in any period of the contract. The second item owes
to the fact that any feasible contract remains feasible when θ rises.
A.1.5 Proof of proposition 6
Proof. Since φ =0w eh a v eν{0} = 1, and an agent’s type is summarized by their managerial
talent. By the theorem of the maximum, the set of competitive contract for each type is upper-
hemi continuous (u.h.c) in w. Because diﬀerent agents of a given type can be oﬀered diﬀerent
contracts, and µ has ﬁnite support, the left-hand side of equation (5) is the sum of a ﬁnite
number of u.h.c, non-empty and convex correspondences, and so is also u.h.c. in w,n o n - e m p t y
and convex. As w becomes large, this left-hand side can be made negative.
On the other hand, this left-hand side becomes positive when w is small. To see this,
note that in the second period of their life, agents of age 2 can operate with at least ﬁnancing
w(1 + r). With ﬁnancing w(1 + r), managers can ﬁnance inputs
1+r

















αk − w(1 + r)
Because αk < 1 it now follows that π(w;z;w) >w (1 + r)f o rw small enough. Furthermore,
it should be clear (and simple manipulations of ﬁrst order conditions show) that as w   0,
n → w(1+r)s ot h a tf o rw small enough, n>1+r
2. But this implies that for w small enough,
all agents of age 2 or more become managers, and they all hire more than one unit of labor, so
that the excess demand for labor must be positive.
A standard application of Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point theorem now shows that a value w can
be found such that labor markets clear. Since φ = 0, the distribution of bequests puts all mass
at zero and is trivially invariant. Therefore, we have obtained the desired steady state.
Now consider raising θ to θ .G i v e nθ and w, I have shown that optimal contracts can be
found so as to satisfy (5). When θ rises to θ , holding w ﬁxed, agents become managers earlier,
and employ more workers in every period. Therefore, at w, optimal contracts can be found
that make the left-hand side of equation (5) positive. The same continuity argument as above
now implies that a new steady state wage w  must exist with w  >w .
27A.2 Steady state bequest distribution
The excess demand for labor correspondence can be deﬁned as the composition of two mappings.
The ﬁrst mapping takes the wage w into the unique distribution of bequests satisfying the
third condition of my equilibrium deﬁnition. The second maps this distribution into the set of
corresponding values for the aggregate excess demand of labor.
Consider the ﬁrst mapping. For each w>0, V ∗ − b is bounded above uniformly across
individual types since µ has compact support. Let ¯ V be such an uniform bound and deﬁne
g(b,z;w,θ) ≡ γβT−1V ∗(b,z;wθ). Then, for all (b,z) ∈ I R+ × [0,1],
g(b,z;w,θ) <γ β
−(T−1)(¯ V + bβ
−1).
Since γβ−T < 1 by assumption 1, there exists ¯ b ∈ I R+ such that for all b ∈ [0,¯ b], g(b,z;w,θ) ∈
[0,¯ b]. Now let B[0,¯ b]b et h es e to fa l lB o r e lm e a s u r e so n[ 0 ,¯ b] and deﬁne Tw : B[0,¯ b] →B [0,¯ b]
by,




The operator Tw describes the evolution of the distribution of bequests in this economy under
the assumption that the unskilled wage is ﬁxed at w. Now observe the following:
Remark 7. For all Borel subset B ∈ [0,¯ b],a n db ∈ [0,¯ b], (Twχb){B} > 1−φ or (Twχb){Bc} >
1 − φ
where for all b ∈ I R, χb denotes the point-mass distribution that puts all mass at b while Bc
denotes the complement of B in [0,¯ b]. To see this, note that from all b ∈ [0,¯ b]t h eM a r k o v
process goes to zero with probability 1 − φ.S i n c e0∈ [0,¯ b]=B ∪Bc the result trivially holds.
Theorem 11.12 in Stokey et al. (1989) now implies:
Lemma 8. For all w>0, the Markov chain deﬁned by Tw is geometrically ergodic. That is,
there exist a distribution νw ∈B [0,¯ b] and a constant 0 < <1 such that for all b ∈ [0,¯ b],
 T nχb − νw ≤ n χb − νw .
In the statement of the lemma,  .  denotes the total variation norm. Finally, the Markov
process deﬁned by Tw satisﬁes a law of large numbers.
Proposition 9. For w>0 let {bn}
+∞
n=0 be any run of the Markov process deﬁned by Tw.L e tf








Proof. Pick any B ∈ [0,¯ b] such that νw{B} > 0. For all b,l e tP be the transition probability
function implied by Tw and let P n be the n-fold composition of this function. Since νw{B} > 0,
lemma 8 and remark 7 imply that for some integer n, P n(0,B) > 0. It must then be the case
that bn ∈ B inﬁnitely often with probability one. The result now follows from Theorem 3 in
Tierney (1994).
28A.3 Calibration of the distribution of managerial talent
In this appendix, we select θ and specify µ so that, given other exogenous parameters, the aver-
age growth rate and the size distribution of establishments match their empirical counterparts
in the U.S. manufacturing sector.
Assume ﬁrst that θ = 1. In that case, a manager’s talent and the employment-size of the
establishment he operates are monotonically related. Indeed, let w be the equilibrium wage.
First order conditions for unconstrained net income maximization for a manager of talent z
imply:
zn
αk+αn−1 ∝ w(1 + r),
so that employment is linear in z
1
1−αk−αn. Now observe that the model implies a lower bound
on establishment size in this economy. Indeed, ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization
imply that the manager’s net income is given by:
(1 − αk − αn)Azk
αkn
αn =
1 − αk − αn
αn
nw(1 + r)
An agent will become a manager only provided this income exceeds the unskilled wage, that is:
1 − αk − αn
αn




1 − αk − αn
Thus the distribution of establishments implied by my model given the distribution of talent
will be truncated at αn
1−αk−αn approximately 3.5 employees given the values I set for technological
shares.
In the Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns survey, manufacturing establishments
are classiﬁed in nine employment size categories: 1 to 4 employees, 5 to 9, 10 to 19, 20 to
49, 50 to 99, 100 to 249, 250 to 499, 500 to 999, and 1000 or more employees. Because of
the lower bound implied by my model, I combine the ﬁrst two size categories. An initial
guess for µ is then obtained as follows. Assume that z
1
1−αk−αn is log-normally distributed with
location and dispersion parameters λ1 and λ2, respectively. Under the assumption that θ =1 ,
the distribution of establishments implied by my model is then log-normally distributed and
left-truncated at αn
1−αk−αn. The two parameters of the distribution can then be selected by
maximum-likelihood so that the implied distribution approximates its empirical counterpart
in the 1988 County Business Pattern Survey. This gives me a continuous guess ˜ µ for the
distribution of managerial talent, and a truncation point z∗ such that agents become managers
only if z>z ∗. To obtain a discrete guess, I assume that the support of µ consists of 4 points
to the right of z∗ and forty equally spaced points to the left of z∗. Then letting {zi}44
i=1 be the
support of µ,Il e tµ{zi} =˜ µ(
zi+zi+1
2 ) − ˜ µ(
zi+zi−1
2 )f o ri ∈{ 1,44},w h e r ez0 =0a n sz45 =1 .
29The four points to the right of z∗ are chosen to match the average size of manufacturing
establishments in the U.S. in each of the 4 categories shown in table 1.
This gives me a starting guess for θ and µ. That guess gives an approximately correct
distribution of establishments for the U.S., but, counterfactually, no establishment growth since
θ = 1. Evans (1987) estimates with data from 100 manufacturing industries between 1976 and
1980 that manufacturing ﬁrms with 5 years or less of existence grow at yearly rate of roughly
2.6%. Based on this estimate, I arrive at ﬁnal guess for θ and µ by following the following
iterative method:
1. Given all other parameters, update θ until establishment growth between their ﬁrst and
second period of existence is (1.026)8 − 1 percent on average in steady state.
2. Update z41 until, in steady state, the fraction of establishments with 1 to 9 employees
matches the fraction shown in table 1 in the U.S.
3. Similarly update z42,z 43 and z44.
I repeat steps (1-3) until θ and {zi}i≥41 become approximately invariant. With this method, I
arrive at θ =0 .72 and the distribution of managerial talent shown in ﬁgure 1.
30Figure 1: Distribution of managerial talent
















31Figure 2: Impact of θ on steady state statistics
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